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This essay begins with a consideration of two anxieties about
courts that are common to the civil and common law traditions: a
worry about illegitimate judicial law making, and a worry about
judicial bias. It will then move to the contribution legal theories
might make in dealing with these shared anxieties, with a focus on
a position that draws on the two largest contestants: natural law
and legal positivism. It will end with an indication of the further
distance that theory needs to take us before these worries about the
judiciary can be effectively tackled.
I. THE TWO ANXIETIES
The civil and common law systems both raise a question that is
well known. How is it possible to combine the acknowledged fact
that courts often make fresh law with the belief that the legislature
is the site for law making with which democracies are most
comfortable? Courts create new law as frequently as they deliver
answers to questions which codes, statute and/or previous judicial
interpretations of a body of norms leave open. How can the
democratic suspicion of this law making capacity be given its
proper place while acknowledging the undeniable fact of judicial
* Professor, School of Law, University of Essex, United Kingdom.
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creativity that takes place every time a need to interpret the law is
placed before the court?
This dilemma accompanies the other one indicated at the
beginning: how can one identify and cope with judicial bias? The
latter is more of a practical than a fundamental concern when we
are dealing with straightforward corruption of the judicial office.
But it becomes a more complex and elusive defect when we try to
track down what can be called unintentional bias. Here we need to
tease apart legitimate moral and political convictions that judges
must bring to bear on many open questions of law from those
moral and political beliefs that, if allowed to sway judgement, we
condemn as an abuse. The hunt for judicial bias is, in its easier
version, a hunt for bad faith: watching out for the judge who hides
his or her moral and political objectives beneath a set of principles
that appear to be neutral. The more troublesome situation,
however, arises when judges are of good faith. The latter believe
in all honesty that they are deploying a principle impartially as
they reason towards a result, but an observer can spot the fact that
despite good intentions the decision is deploying a principle that
should not be brought to bear without, at the very least, being
voted on by the people at large.1
II. CURES
A. Positivism
One popular way of guiding people through these dilemmas is
proposed by legal positivism. This takes the view that moral and
political impartiality within a legal system is achieved via relying
on value free sources of law. That is, if we have a stable and
shareable way of seeing what the existing law is, whatever else
separates us in moral and political belief, then this terrain can
serve as a benchmark for seeing when judges have overstepped
their limits by being unduly creative, and we can then also see
when bias–albeit unintentional–has crept into what they are doing.
What the existing law says at present, says the positivist, must be
rigorously separated from considerations of what the law ought to
be in the future.
Given the anxieties that we are focused on here, it is useful to
flag two variants of positivism that are relevant. One can be called
a two-stage model. According to this, a properly functioning legal
1. Sheldon Leader, Impartiality, Bias, and the Judiciary, in READING
DWORKIN CRITICALLY 241-268 (Alan Hunt ed. 1992).
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system contains rules and principles giving guidance to judges
enabling them to identify the existing law. They must attend to
this guidance, without bringing to bear any view about what they
want law to be in the future. That is a second stage activity, which
must be rigorously separated from the first. If a judge allows his
forward looking preferences about what future law should look
like to color his perception of what the existing law says, then he is
doing a particular sort of damage: he is allowing his preferences to
be smuggled into what looks on the surface like a description of
the present law. The losing party is then told that he has broken
the law as it is, when in reality, says the positivist, he has broken
the law that the judge would like to put in place–well after the
action for which the defendant is brought before the court. The
loser is, in short, being retroactively punished.
The work of HLA Hart tries to show us when this abuse
happens.2 A rule of recognition, he argues, exists in all legal
systems worthy of the name. This rule reports the converging
views of legal officials about where existing law is to be found:
about how certain norms can be picked out from the forest of
maxims, customs, and convictions we live by in society. That
which is identified in this way can be stably recognised as existing
law–a candidate for application in a fresh case. If it turns out that
the candidature fails–that a new case is not clearly or satisfactorily
covered by existing law–then the judge is, Hart argues, entitled to
proceed to the next stage of adding to the body of law with a fresh
decision.
We are not told by this variety of positivism what the proper
scope for judicial creativity is at that next stage. Hart confines
himself to the task of avoiding mystification: barring the judge
from delivering a solution to what he pretends, or honestly but
mistakenly believes, to be the existing law when he is actually
shaping the law in the way he wants it to develop in the future.
This positivist tries to offer a solution for the two anxieties with
tools that yield clarity. Once we are clear about the stage at which
the judge is applying existing law and the stage at which he is
making fresh law then at least we are able to engage, says the
positivist, in a useful debate about the proper dimensions of the
judge’s adventures at the second stage. Without this protocol in
hand, the positivist insists, we will not be able to reach that debate
because the judge will not be able to see, at any point in time,
when she has identified existing law and when she is
unconsciously drawing on her vision of the future.
2. HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
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A second variant of legal positivism goes further, and does so
in a way that is relevant for present purposes. According to this
species, the law enacted, particularly in the form of a code, is
‘complete.’ This does not mean that the code is complete in the
sense that it already contains all answers to the questions that it
may be used to answer: it is not a claim that the enacted law is
normatively omniscient, containing already all answers to any
possible questions put to it. It is instead a different thesis: that the
enacted code already contains the answers to all open questions of
law appropriate for courts to use as they apply the instrument. If
the answer is not to be found, and a solution is nevertheless
needed, then legislative amendment of enacted law is appropriate,
not a change in the law introduced by judge.
This brand of legal positivism is therefore much more
prescriptive about the role of courts than is the first. Judges must
confine themselves to looking for existing law to apply to fresh
cases, and if the code or statute does not contain the answers, then
for judicial purposes the matter is finished. The code commands
him or her to deliver a solution that reflects the fact that the
plaintiff does not have the law on her side, and hence that the
defendant cannot be made to suffer on the basis of a solution that
the judge thinks would be the right one to offer. If full justice is
not achieved in such a case, because people like the defendant
should, for moral reasons, be held accountable for what they did,
then we are told that the solution is to be delivered at another time
and in another place: where the will of the people is registered.3
Future defendants of this type can then be caught by fresh law, and
if the people will a retroactive application of law to the defendant,
making him guilty now for what he was not liable for back when
he did what he did, then Hart tells us that we are at least remaining
clear that this is what is happening.
B. Natural Law
Natural law proposes a quite distinct cure for the two anxieties
we are focusing on. However, it is important to start by noticing
that the natural lawyer’s position takes as its point of departure a
belief that is actually shared by positivists. That is, natural
lawyers start with a conviction that we must rigorously distinguish
existing law from the law to be shaped by man in the future.
Natural lawyers do this, as do the positivists, in order to prevent
3. For a recent statement of this view, extending beyond codes to the
interpretation of constitutions, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT (2001) passim.
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people from being punished by rules that pretend to be existing
law, but falsely so. Here, however, the means used to reach this
objective are radically different. The existing law, says the natural
lawyer, is at certain crucial points quite separate from anything
human beings can enact. It is binding law, but is so because of the
force of the values that all valid legal systems must embody,
failing which they do not qualify as legal systems.4
The difference between these two orientations–as bulwarks
against undue judicial creativity and against judicial bias–is that
the positivist will allow the judge to rely on a moral, political, or
economic principle that might be highly divisive within the polity–
and to do so under the mantle of applying the existing law–only if
that principle has been imported into the legal system by a past
legal event: constitutional enactment, legislation, or previous
judicial decision. If he cannot do that, then he will be changing
the law as a judge–which the first but not the second species of
positivist will allow. The natural lawyer, by contrast, waits on no
such past enactment of positive law: a judge might bring to bear a
moral principle that is strongly controversial within a particular
polity, but if he can show this principle to flow from natural
morality rather than a contingently existing positive moral code, he
will not be altering but rather giving effect to existing law.
C. An Intermediate Theory
Both positivism and natural law carry their own frustrations
when trying to work with them in order to respond to our two
anxieties about courts. A general treatment of those shortcomings
is not relevant here. It is, however, possible to draw on both of
these traditions, and via this synthesis to find a different way of
responding to the two concerns. The first point to notice in
building an alternative strategy is that it is necessary to jettison the
positivist injunction to the judge to confine herself to a source that
will itself provide the appropriate values that apply in a given case.
It is possible to rely on sources, but it is an illusion to think that
these stand in front of the judge ready for inspection, independent
of her views about what the law should be. The reason is that
what counts as a source of law is itself the product of deploying
moral values. For example, the judge might accept the injunction
to ‘follow precedent’ in a common law system, but this injunction
does not tell him whether to opt for recent developments in
4. For a secular example of this position, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY
(rev. ed. 1969).

OF LAW
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collateral areas of the law, or to give priority to the direct line of
cases that deal with the subject matter at hand. Doing the latter
might yield one result in a case, while doing the former might lead
to the opposite result.5 In the civil law tradition, deciding what the
Code ‘says’ is a product of first deciding on the weight to give to
e.g. the enactor’s intentions, developments in later social
conditions, etc.
We also need to revisit the claim that a piece of enacted law
can be complete. If this means that the judge is not to draw on
values lying outside of those that have already been enacted, then
again this does not look adequate. It is a variant of the positivist
mistake about sources. The completeness thesis claims that a
divisive moral, political, or economic principle may well be part of
the existing law, but only if they are first enacted into the system
by an authoritative step taken by the legislature, in the form of,
say, a code. That simply reproduces the view that what counts as
part of the code can be identified in a value free way. If it is true
that there is no way of construing a source, such as legal precedent
without deciding, in the light of moral or political principle, what
scope and weight to give to different branches of precedent, then
the assignment of that scope and weight must come from values
that lie outside of any given set of precedents. The same point
applies to a code. A code cannot generate from within itself the
values that will guide those interpreting it when they must decide
what weight to give to each of its features. If it tries to do this–by
giving a schedule of answers to all questions about its proper mode
of interpretation–there must be a prior commitment of the
interpreter to accept this protocol as binding: that is itself a
commitment that must come from outside of the code itself.
This is not just a dry point of conceptual housekeeping. It can
color judicial attitudes of deference to any given code. Why
should any particular judge accept the injunction to stay within the
values already announced in the code, and to rely on legislative
amendment of that code if she is not happy with what she finds?
Why should she not take it on herself to supply what she is
convinced is missing, and would make the code better? Courts are
often willing and indeed should override the letter and spirit of any
single piece of enacted law in order to achieve a larger coherence,
as well as a result that corresponds to the best normative position
that the judiciary can in good faith deploy.
This last point is central to one of the better-known
theorists occupying this intermediate position, Ronald Dworkin.
5. For an example, see, R v Lemon (1979) 1 All ER 898.
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Dworkin’s view is particularly worth exploring–both for its merits
and its shortcomings–as helping to see what common and civil law
traditions can do to cope with the two anxieties about judicial
power.
III. DWORKIN’S POSITION
When a judge reaches an answer to open question of law, he or
she is properly confined to ‘finding’ appropriate answers within
the existing law, argues Dworkin. But this not same sense of
‘finding’ an answer as is deployed by the natural lawyer, nor by
the species of positivist who believes that the enacted law is
complete in the sense identified above.
Some initial definitions will help here in order to pin down
what is meant by judges finding rather than creating law:
Settled law: This is a collection of valid statements of law, as
in the report that a given system provides 1, protection against
unwarranted use of trade secrets; 2, against publication of an
author’s work without his or her consent; 3, against circulation of
photographic images of someone; and finally 4, that it provides a
general right to privacy.6 These examples divide into two types:
explicit and implicit propositions. Imagine that the explicit
propositions are 1 through 3, but not 4.
The first three statements are true because of enactment by an
authoritative source: judges in previous cases, legislation, or an
enacted code. The statement that there is a right to privacy within
the settled law, by way of contrast, is not true because of any
specific enactment. It is instead a right that has emerged over
time. It stands to the explicitly enacted rights as a genus stands in
relation to distinct species. The latter have enough in common to
allow them to be grouped together into a generic class. The genus
contains elements that enable us to understand each of the separate
species more comprehensively and effectively than is possible if
each species is grasped separately. Thus, Warren and Brandeis
offered their famous demonstration that the right to privacy
formed part of the existing law by showing that it emerged from
the more narrowly defined range of explicit rights in the set made
up inter alia of rights 1 through 3. To posit the existence of the
right to privacy allowed them to understand and to justify a range
of explicit rights, even if it is not formally announced by the courts
or legislature or constitution.
6. This is a well known set of examples drawn from the analysis of the right
to privacy by Warren and Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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Implicit propositions of law are built up out of earlier legal
events, which enact the more narrowly defined norms in the
system. These implicit elements allow us to link a range of
differently grounded answers to past questions of law and also to
provide a generic category or principle under which a fresh case
can be subsumed.7
Finding and making law by judges: Judges can make law in
the course of their decisions in one of two ways: they might add to
the explicit elements in the system, adding, for example, an
extension or a narrowing to the coverage or a given rule. This
happens frequently and routinely. Or, they might add to the body
of implicit propositions within the system. This is very rare, but
can and does happen.
Judges can find law in two corresponding senses: they might
find an existing explicit norm; or they might ‘find’ an implicit
norm. In doing the latter a judge may conclude that while there is
no explicit law governing a new situation, there is implicit law
governing it because the generic principles that make most sense
of the previous explicit norms lead coherently to this situation
being covered as well. It should be noted that when a judge finds
the law in this second sense he or she is constructing a rationale
for previous explicit norms post hoc: that is, a fresh and more
comprehensive principle is substituted for the one which in fact
grounded the particular, more narrowly grounded norm.
A. Dworkin’s Argument
A way of rendering Dworkin’s position is to say that judges
may add to the body of explicit law, but in doing so they should
stay faithful to the body of implicit law. Within this constraint, the
judge is entitled to extend the coverage of implicit law on grounds
of coherence. If, for example, he or she can unify the solutions
from past enacted law under the mantle of a right to privacy, then
even if not expressed that way before and even if earlier law was
actually grounded on different principles, the law is properly
extended in this way.
How do a judge’s moral convictions fit into this picture? If the
building up of an implicit part of the law was simply a matter of
reporting what explicit law says, and then of reporting the areas in
7. Another example, drawn from civil law, could be the emergence or
liability for unjust enrichment, implicitly drawn from decisions on a provision in
the French civil code requiring the restoring of money ‘paid when no debt was
owing.’
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which distinct branches of that law overlap such that the new
implicit principle is a notional lowest common denominator, then
there is no room for moral judgement. It is a matter of description,
however complex that description might be. But this misconstrues
the demands of this approach. In constructing a plausible implicit
part of the law, there are various ways in which the construction
can happen. If we go back to the right to privacy, the area of
overlap between the explicit parts of the law identified by Warren
and Brandeis converges on the proposition that one has, as they
put it, a “right to be left alone.” But there is a good deal more that
has to be decided about the nature of the entitlement to be left
alone before it can function as an implicit part of the system. We
have to know if it is a right that can be overridden relatively easily
by, say, an employer who wants to tap telephones because he
wants to know if personnel have critical attitudes toward
management that could make a difference to corporate
performance, or if he can only legitimately tap those telephones if
he reasonably suspects some graver harm, such as employee
frauds. In other words, decisions have to be made about the
character of the right: about its relative weight against competing
rights; about the character of the interests it is best suited to
protect; about its availability against interference by private as
well as public bodies; etc.
These characterising decisions are themselves moral and
political. They are not dictated by the character of separate parts
of explicit law, and cannot be extracted by seeing where those
separate simply overlap. Moral values have to be brought to bear.
They are choices that cannot flatly contradict the values that
explicit law is grounded on, but they can fill out those values in
ways that are unexpected by the authors of past legislation,
constitutions, or legal decisions. They must, as Dworkin puts it,
‘fit.’8
This intermediate position, and the form it takes in Dworkin’s
theory, would easily find himself in the shoes of the civilian jurist
as depicted by Julio Cueto-Rua, “...every case should be
considered as an example of a class; the class, species of genus;
the genus as a species of another genus of a hither degree of
generality; and so on until very general and basic concepts are
finally defined.”9

8. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) passim.
9. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 646, 647
(1997).
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B. Critique
How well has intermediate theoretical position responded to
the two anxieties that our systems share: the concern to place
limits on judicial law making, and the concern to achieve moral
and political impartiality? Insofar as Civil Law holds to belief in
the completeness of Codes in the form examined–a preference for
legislative amendment over judicial development of the law–then
this is a constraint that Dworkin would be likely to reject. So, it
seems, would many civilians. But how far are they willing to go
in Dworkin’s direction? The ideal judge for Dworkin legitimately
reaches across all elements of enacted law, all codes and all case
law, to achieve harmony between them. The guardian of the
keystone principles, on this approach, should be the judiciary.
This seems to complement Cueto-Rua’s argument that the civilian
approach leads the system to keep pushing for coherence across
domains of law “...until very general and basic concepts are finally
defined.” Such coherence is not, and cannot be, in the ultimate
control of legislatures.
Such a conclusion might raise difficulties about democracy in
a particular way. Concerns about the undemocratic nature of
judicial power arise from two related directions. One has to do
with the problem of majority rule and minority rights, asking how
far it is legitimate to frustrate the former in order to protect the
latter. Linked to this, however, is another less well publicised
problem that is relevant to the issues dealt with in this essay: what
weight is to be given to an understanding of law as an expression
of will and law as an instantiation of principle?
To rely on the will of the people when interpreting the law is to
accept that ‘this is the law because they want it this way and the
fact that they have expressed their preference deserves respect.’
To rely on principle is to reach for results that are due respect not
because the fit with the wishes of a particular body, but because
good convincing reasons, independent of those wishes, can be
given to show that this solution is defensible. Dworkin is inclined
to allow principle to have a dominant role in the polity.
That dominant role makes sense when we are dealing with
single fundamental values, and asking about their coherent
extension. It is more of a problem when we have to assign
priorities to–or otherwise combine–competing values, all prima
facie fundamental and each backed with competing fundamental
rights. Here, the relevant considerations unfold in more complex
ways. Courts are best placed to deal with these competing rights
when the exercise of one will have a very damaging effect on one
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and will make a marginal impact on the other. For example,
exercising ones right to free speech under an opponent’s bedroom
window seems intuitively to call for an adjustment of the former in
order to do less damage to the latter.
However, there are some situations where both of the right
holders can have their backs to the wall: one or the other must
win, leaving the loser with little room for an alternative way of
exercising their right. The winner takes all. The parties find
themselves in this situation if, for example, a small business is in
financial crisis, and has to work on Sundays: can it legitimately
require its employees to work those days when their church
explicitly requires Sunday attendance? Can an employee be put in
this position when he or she does not have a realistic prospect of
finding an alternative job? If someone’s only prospect of proving
her partner’s violence is to adduce private correspondence in court,
should the right to privacy give way to the right to bodily safety?
If a doctor has to choose between killing one of two Siamese twins
or letting both die, how should he proceed?
Here it may be that the clash of values is close enough that we
need a decision that is respected just because it has been rendered
in good faith, and not because we happen to be convinced by the
strength of the principles adduced in support of it. It may be too
close a call for the latter approach. Of course, these clashes may
first surface in front of a court, and the court must do its best to
decide given the urgency of the situation. But it would be better if
the priorities between basic rights here could be guided at least by
principles given to us by other law making organs: organs such as
legislatures where law as an expression of will finds a greater
place. Ultimate clashes of value, such as here, should better be
proactively dealt with–wherever realistic to do so–by legislatures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The civil and common law systems share worries about
judicial power and seem to entertain similar solutions to those
worries. Each is legitimately frustrated by the proposals that
natural law or legal positivism offer. Both can potentially make
use of the intermediate theory sketched here. Civilian and
common lawyers, in their daily work, put a challenge to that
theory: they force it to answer the large questions about the
division of powers between judiciary and legislature via the more
narrow and detailed questions that arise when basic rights compete
with one another in concrete cases. The common need to get these
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answers right overshadows anything that might separate the two
systems.

